Abstract: This paper introduces the development and situation of urban and rural old age security system in China, and discusses the challenges and options in the process of constructing a sustained old age security system. China's pension system now has a high coverage rate for urban workers, but a low coverage rate for rural farmers. Funding gap and empty individual accounts have imposed a heavy burden on the sustainability of urban pension system. The more severe age wave and lower income in rural area pose challenges to the vulnerable rural household support system. The separation of old age security system between rural and urban areas also puts great pressure on the urbanization of landless farmers. Therefore, it is urgent for China to speed up the reform of its old age security system to provide an institutional support for its smooth economic and social transition.
establish a universal basic old age security system at its low-income level to achieve the goal of caring for the growing number of elders. This paper has five parts: part one introduces the development and situation of urban old age security system reform; part two introduces the development and situation of rural old age security system reform; part three discusses the vulnerability of current urban old age security system; part four analyzes the strategic implications of rural old age security system; part five investigates the role of social security in the alleviation of elderly poverty; the final part examines future challenges and puts forward options to build up a sustained old age security system.
I. Urban Old Age Security System Reform
In the planned economy, enterprises or work units were obligated to deliver old age security to urban workers. At that time, the state took a unified management approach to enterprise finance, planning for revenue and expenditures, profits and losses. Enterprises were responsible for both the delivery and administration of basic pensions to their own retirees according to the years of employment and the wage received prior to retirement. The state utilized the form of Pay-As-You-Go system to finance pensions and provided a cradle-to-grave service for urban workers through enterprise-based security system, which intrinsically met the requirement of the planned economy.
The market-oriented reform since late 1970s dismantled the basis for the existence of traditional old age security system. The introduction of enterprise responsibility system and abolishment of lifetime employment system at state-owned enterprises in mid-1980s not only changed the financial relationship between enterprises and the state, but also changed the relationship between enterprises and employees. After the implementation of profit sharing and paying income tax instead of turning profit over to the state, enterprises must partially take the responsibility of accumulating and paying pensions. The Decision on the Reform of Enterprise Pension System promulgated in 1991 specified an overall framework for the establishment of an old age security system. It called for a multi-pillared system combining a social basic pillar with supplemental enterprise-sponsored pensions and individual savings for old age. In this system, pension financing is shared by the government, enterprises and individuals. 2 After setting up the framework for old age security system, the reform after mid-1990s mainly focused on the construction of social basic pillar, the enlargement of pension pools and the expansion of insurance coverage. In 1993, the Third Plenary Session of the 14 th Communist
Party Central Committee promulgated a Decision on Issues of Establishing a Socialist Market
Economy System, laying down the principle of establishing the basic old age insurance system through the combination of pooled funds and individual accounts.
In 1997, the State Council promulgated a Decision on Establishing a Uniform Basic Old Age
Insurance System for Enterprise Employees, detailing the establishment of an old age security system by implementing a social-pool-plus-individual-accounts scheme. Individual pension accounts were set up at 11 percent of the employee's wage, in which individual contribution increased gradually from 4 percent to 8 percent and the remaining part coming from the enterprises. The ratio of enterprise contribution, set by the provincial government, normally
should not exceed 20 percent of the total payroll of the enterprise. This financing strategy is, in essence, a combination of the traditional pay-as-you-go benefits and fully individual contributory system and can be best characterized as a partially individual contributory system. As the reforms moved ahead, the coverage of urban old age security system has been gradually expanded. 
II. Rural Old Age Security System Reform
Prior to reforms, rural old age security took a model of low-level collective system. Under rural people's communes, land and other basic means of production were collectively owned.
Farmers were organized to work together and a unified distribution was implemented. The
Household Registration System prohibited the free migration of farmers to prevent the shocks on urban welfare system. Rural laborers are entitled to distribution of products through participating in the production and operation of rural economic collectives. Only when they totally lose the ability to work are they eligible to withdraw from production activities and taken care of by family members. Childless and disable old persons are guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses by the collectives.
The introduction of Household Responsibility System dismantled the institutional basis for collective-based social security system in rural areas. The basic guarantees previously provided by the collectives, including employment, income and old age security, are now farmers' own responsibilities. Although the state calls for the establishment of a double-track management system that combines unified and separate operations, collective economy no longer exists in the 5 vast majority of rural areas. Rural communities lack organizational resources to effectively provide income security and medical care to rural residents.
China began to try out reforming old age security system in some of the rural areas and urban areas almost simultaneously. In 1986, pilot projects for establishing an old-age social insurance system were carried out in rural areas, starting from economically developed areas. employees are divided into three groups with different basic old age insurance benefits. The "old men", those who were already retired in 1997, will continue to receive pre-reform benefits that typically replace 80 percent of wages. The "new men", those who join after 1997, will receive a pay-as-you-go benefit and a personal account benefit. The "middle men", those who were contributing workers in 1997, will receive partial benefits under both systems. The reform intended to finance the retirement of the participants in the pre-reform system through pooling of 7 social basic pension funds.
However, the new system inherited huge deficits from preexisting liabilities of the old system. Sourc g.
reality, pay-as-you-go system is still used to deliver urban old age pension security (See regard evasion an income source. Contribution evasion is equivalent to a certain profit returns, therefore, most of enterprises tried to take measures such as hiring temporary and short-term contract workers, reducing total payroll and number of actual employment to escape the contributory responsibility (Zhang and Qiu, 2003) . In the meantime, 80 percent of participants in the basic social pool are State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers. As most of SOEs are unprofitable and cannot afford insurance premium, social security bureaus have to raise contribution rate to make up for the dwindling insurance fund, which results in a vicious circle.
Empty accounts and low expected returns also cause the failure to attract more participants the basic old age insurance. In the multiple pillars recommended by the World Bank, the mandatory individual pension account is individually-owned. But in China, the ownership of individual account is in legal limbo. The mixed management of social pools and individual accounts lends itself to the problem of diverting individual account contributions to cover deficits in the social pools. Individual accounts have become purely "notional". The government lowers the returns on individual accounts in order to cut its liabilities to future pension benefits.
When the return on individual accounts is lower than the opportunity cost, contribution evasion is inevitable (Zhao and Xu, 2000) . In this scenario, it's almost impossible to ensure the genuine funding of individual accounts, which further exacerbates the collection and accumulation of individual accounts.
China's immature the returns are low. In early days, the government strictly regulated that 80 percent of social security funds should be invested in government bonds and 20 percent should be deposited in bank accounts (West, 1997; Feldstein, 1998 Although urban basic old age insurance has enlarged its coverage range since 1999, it failed to ra l experiences, a sustained pay-as-you-go pension system needs three prere
V. The Importance of Rural Old Age Security System
A sustained rural family-based old age security system calls for the following prerequisites: ces ise the coverage ratio in urban workers. In 2004, only 46.3 percent of urban workers participated in the basic old age insurance, about the same as that in 1995. However, the ongoing demographic change has increased the burden of urban old age security system. In 1990, there were 6.1 workers for every retiree. In 2003, this number fell to 2.7. Even taking into consideration the inflow of young rural migrants, the rising pressure on the urban social security system is hardly mitigated.
In light of internationa quisites (Cai and Meng, 2004) : (1) a relatively young demographic structure to provide for the existing pensioners; (2) an effective taxation system to levy potential premiums for old age insurance; (3) an efficient and safe mechanism to manage and administer pension funds, ensuring the value and appreciation of the funds through proper investments. With none of the three prerequisites, China cannot operate the pay-as-you-go pension system to provide a sustainable old age security net to urban elderly.
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(1) a relatively large household population size to share incomes or avoid risks; (2) a source of stable income to maintain the living standard; (3) a good social network (such as relatives, neighbors and friends) to minimize external risks that are difficult to borne by a single family.
With the socio-economic transformation, rural family-based old age security fa unprecedented challenges. Firstly, the implementation of family planning policy in rural areas downsizes families, shifting them from extended families to nuclear families. The average population per household fell from 5.7 in 1978 to 4.1 in 2003, and will decline in the long run.
Secondly, rural-to-urban population migration leads to an older rural population. According to the 2000 Census, the elderly made up 7.5 percent of rural population as compared to 6.4 percent of 10 urban population. Under the constraints of Household Registration System, few farmers migrate the whole family to urban areas. The majority of migrants to urban areas are young working adults. On top of that, as western "individualistic" value gain currency, more and more elders find it difficult to live with children. Speeding up urbanization will contribute to the further aging of rural population. Thirdly, the security and incomes coming from farmland have been declining. Despite the dual roles farmland plays in rural household business, i.e., means of production and livelihood, farmland cannot become the major income source and safety net for farmers, due to its small scale, lack of liquidity and unstable ownership. Farmers are increasingly relying on non-agricultural sectors as their major income sources. Fourthly, the function of rural social network has been on the decline. The ratio of income transfer between rural households to rural per capita net income fell from 11.7 percent in 1980 to 3.7 percent in
2003. In addition, the collective economy in rural area has been in decline, rendering it unable to provide any relief to households in difficulty.
With the downward trend of family-based rural old age security, it is necessary to establish a rm perience in some European countries, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and pai fo al old age security system in rural areas to ensure old age support in the midst of dramatic socio-economic transformation. The stagnation and even recession in the development of rural old age security system since 1998 were not only the results of mismanagement and low coverage rate of rural old age insurance system, but also the government's unwillingness to make financial commitment to set up such a system. One of the official considerations is that China's low level of economic development renders it immature to establish an old age security system in rural areas.
This judgment is wrong.
In terms of historic ex S n began legislation for the establishment of rural old age security system in 1891, 1913, 1919 and 1947, respectively. Per capita GDP of these four countries at those times were equivalent to 79.3 percent, 99.9 percent, 46.6 percent and 73.3 percent of China's per capita GDP in 1999 at a comparable basis (Zeng, 2005) . Most of the 15 EU membership countries didn't have basic old age security for farmers at the very beginning and integrated farmers into their social security system from late to the end of 20 th century. In terms of agricultural labor share, agricultural output, per capita income level, China's development level and rural economic level have been on par with or exceeded the corresponding average conditions of those countries at those times (Yang 11 it. al., 2004). Therefore, economic development level shouldn't be a constraint and it is now the time to establish a rural old age security system in China.
From a strategic perspective, the establishment and improvement of an old age security syste ity system in rural areas is crucial to the balan in rural area will activate the function of pr m in rural areas will have important implications. Firstly, setting up a rural old age security system is important to cope with rural aging population. At present, two-third of China's elderly live in rural areas. After the establishment of urban old age security system, the government should shift emphasis to rural areas. Any delay in preparing for the age wave will miss the current opportunities. Moreover, the underdeveloped rural old age security system will increase the pressure on "Five Guarantees" system and minimum living allowance system. The key is to choose a good model for rural old age security. If rural old age security adopts individual pension accounts as its funding strategy, the government will not have to make full financial commitment and therefore will not be overburdened.
Secondly, the establishment of an old age secur ced development and integration of rural and urban economies. Since 1990s, rural-urban income gap has widened and this trend will not stop in a foreseeable future. In the long term, to narrow rural-urban disparity makes it necessary to reduce the number of farmers and the ratio of agricultural employment and at the same time improve agricultural productivity. This means that a great amount of rural labor forces need to migrate and choose to permanently settle down in cities. The integration of rural and urban labor markets is a prerequisite for smoothing the movement of rural to urban migration, and old age security system is a supportive basis of effective operation of labor markets. Obstacles in the course of urbanization include issues of providing old age security for rural labors and landless farmers, and integrating rural social security system with urban social security system. If China fails to solve these problems, migration will bring rural poverty into urban areas and exacerbate the poverty problem in cities, which challenges the healthy development of urbanization.
Finally, the establishment of an old age security system oduction factors of farmland, optimize the gender ratio of rural population and promote rural development. The establishment of old age security in rural areas will partially replace the security function of farmland, contribute to the transformation of farmland's function as a production factors, and accelerate the liquidity of farmland and the enlargement of production 12 scale. In addition, old age security will reduce rural families' reliance on children in old age, thus reducing male preference fertility and improving the gender ratio in rural areas.
China could learn from Japan's experience in regulating labor migration and land liquidity throu
. Elderly Poverty and Old Age Security
In his pioneering work on poverty, Rowntree (1901) divided life into five key periods: chil ly Survey, Wang and Zhang (2005) made estim gh pension policy (Yang, it. al., 2004) . Since 1970, Japan began to establish old age insurance in rural areas. By 2002, Japanese farmers' national annuity had three components:
basic pension, old age annuity and land right transfer compensation. After 2002, Japanese farmers' old age insurance consisted of two components: national annuity (basic pension, equivalent payment excluding land right transfer compensation) and agricultural workers' annuity (plan DC). The Basic Law on Agricultural Workers' Annuity in 1970 stipulated that farmers must transfer the full management right of land upon withdrawing from agricultural production and will get a one-time subsidy, which is indexed with commodity prices. This policy not only increased benefits to rural elders but also encouraged farmers to migrate to urban areas and enlarge production scale. With the aging of rural population, Japan adopted a new agricultural annuity system in 2002, which intended to encourage young farmers to stay in rural areas by terminating the compensation for transfer of land management right.
V dhood, early working adulthood, parenthood, working life after children have grown up, and old age. Three periods in the life cycle (including childhood, parenthood and old age) have the highest exposure to poverty-stricken risks. When people become old and withdraw from labor market, the savings and pension contributions accumulated in the working time period will directly determine their livelihood status in old age. If individuals, families and society have made necessary preparation for the old age, the probability that the elderly fall into poverty will be largely reduced. Otherwise they will face a high risk.
Using the 2000 China Urban and Rural Elder ation on elderly poverty at the national level: the aggregate quantity of elderly poverty population is 9.21-11.68 million with a poverty incidence of 7.1-9.0 percent, of which urban elderly poverty population is 1.85-2.46 million with a poverty incidence of 4.2-5.5 percent, 13 and rural elderly poverty population is 7.36-9.22 million with a poverty incidence of 8. Controlling other variables, the econometric analysis revealed the en are less likely to be impoverished than men; (2) age variable doesn't have significant impact on elderly poverty; (3) individual characteristic variables, such as education attainment and political party membership, have significant positive impacts on elderly poverty; (4) participating in labor market has certain impact on urban elderly poverty alleviation whereas little impact on rural elderly poverty; (5) social security, family support and self-insurance have dramatic impacts on elderly poverty. Obviously, gender and age are not the factors on their own that have direct impacts on elderly poverty, while the socioeconomic factors attached to gender and age such as education, security status, difference in income generation at working status, preparation for old age, and so on have direct impacts on elderly poverty.
If individuals, families and society haven't prepared erty will pose enormous challenges to its alleviation. Once elders withdraw from labor market, they cease income generation and lose earnings sources. If there are no other sources of income, elderly poverty will be prone to be a chronic poverty when individual savings run out.
Moreover, the ongoing demographic change will lead to more and more senior elderly people, whose higher disease incidence will definitely drive an increasing demand for medical expenditures and health cares. However, the deficiency of medical care and income security cannot meet the gap between individual needs and expenditures, and will in turn prompt higher poverty incidence in the senior elderly people. Therefore, it is important to set up an old age security system to provide support for old age and alleviate elderly poverty.
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VI. Building up A Sustained Old Age Security System
With the decline of working age population, within 20 or 30 years after 2020, China's social burd lation estimate is made assuming 1.8 as total bearing rate Sourc lation and deve up a new fully individual contributory system is a way out for China's old age secu ty system. Compared with the current pay-as-you-go system, this fully individual en for old-age security will grow to an unbearable extent. China's elderly population aged 65 and above will exceed 100 million in 2005,about 7.5 percent of total population, and will leap to more than 10 percent by 2020. China will enter a more severely aging society in 2040 with an elder aged 65 and above in every five persons (See Figure 4) . Considering the current and future economic development level in decades, the aging challenge arising from increasing demands for old age security is rather tremendous. Therefore, it is urgent for China to reform and adjust urban and rural old age security system geared towards the demographic change, and eliminate its vulnerability to be better prepared for the aging society. 
